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12
The
Pro-Israeli Lobby in the US
and the Inman Affair
11
February 1994
After Admiral Inman's announcement that he
would not serve as Clinton's defence Secretary,
the Hebrew press devoted a fair amount of space
to the implications of that affair for Israel.
The first responses expressed Israeli
satisfaction. A good example is the comment of
Yediot Ahrorsot's Washington's correspondent
Haim Shibi, who wrote that `every Israeli in
Washington could but sigh with relief at the
news of Inman's resignation' (20 January 1994).
However, after a few days, deeper analyses of
that event appeared, disclosing its implications
for Israel, in particular in so far as its
nuclear policies were concerned. Some articles
on that subject, however, also discussed Israeli
influence upon the US exerted via the Jewish
lobby in that country. Most important were the
articles by Amir Oren (Davar, 28 January) and
Yoav Kami, published the same day in Shishi.
Oren's article stressed the incompatibility
between Inman's past policy recommendations and
Israeli political aims, especially in regard to
nuclear matters. Both authors, usually mildly
critical of Israel's policies but never of its
nuclear build-up, were very hostile toward
Inman. Furthermore, Oren discussed in depth
Pollard and Israeli espionage in the US, as
having something to do with Israeli objections
to Inman as a person and to his policy
recommendations.
At about the same time the Hebrew press
reported on the contents of the recently
published book Critical Mass by William E.
Burrows and Robert Windrem. Information
contained in that book about Israeli nuclear
power was assessed by Hebrew press commentators
as accurate, even though its publication was
attributed to the viewpoint of the US officials
known for their objections to Israeli nuclear
power and contingent policies. At the same time
knowledgeable Hebrew press commentators
discussed Israeli threats against Iran,
including those of using nuclear weapons against
that country. After reviewing the Inman affair
as perceived by the Hebrew press, I will discuss
other articles discussing Israeli nuclear
policies and the points where they clash with
the avowed (but seldom actually pursued) nuclear
policies of the US.
(141)
Let me first express my view on the actual
scope of `Jewish influence in the US' and its
capability of bending US policies so as to suit
Israeli interests, also in matters nuclear. Some
of the best informed and most widely read Hebrew
press commentators (who are quoted in this
book), perceive the scale of that influence as
hardly limited by anything and as extending upon
large areas of the world. One of the most
prestigious of Israeli commentators, Yoel Markus
(Haarerz, 31 December 1993) recently spoke of
the 'courtship' of Israel by various states,
concluding tl:ai `ihis courtship has nothing to
do with the peace process: its only reason is
the entire world's recognition of the Protocols
of the Elders of Zion as true. When the US is
being ruled by an administration as favourably
disposed to Israel as the present one,
conviction spreads in every state that the only
way to America's purse leads via Israel. It is
as if this accursed book were not written by an
anti-Semite, but 6y a clever and far-sighted
Jew.' I myself would perceive the scope of that
influence as more restricted. Although it is
obviously very considerable, and although Israel
is doing its best to sustain and augment it,
actual Israeli influence upon the US still falls
far short of the mythology of the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion. Its scope cannot 6e measured
exactly, but it can be estimated, albeit with
the help of guesswork. True, any knowledge, no
matter how approximate, of the extent of Jewish
influence upon the US policies is hard io
obtain. The topic is taboo in the US (although
not in Israel), with all major American Jewish
organizations exerting themselves to maintain
the taboo, often with the help of philosemitic
Christians, who delude themselves that by
gagging discussion of Jewish affairs, and in
particular about Jewish chauvintsm and
exclusivism, they `atone' for the Holocaust.
Reliable knowledge about Israeli influence, as
about any other taboo subject, can be arrived at
only after the interdict is lifted and the
subject is freely discussed.
Oren mentions a number of reasons why Israel
loathed and feared Inman. The main reason he
names is Israeli expectation that if Inman would
be appointed the US Defense Secretary, he would
be able to put into effect independent American
inspections of Israeli nuclear armaments and
their production process in Dimona. It needs to
be recalled that by virtue of a secret agreement
with the US reached during the first year of
John F. Kennedy's term of office as president,
the US to this day receives only such
information about Israeli nuclear power as
Israel is pleased to convey. After the Bay of
Pigs fiasco Kennedy needed the support of the
`Jewish lobby' and in order to get it, he
sanctioned this curious agreement. Oren opens
his article by drawing two horror scenarios
which he regards as perfectly possible if US
policies are ever influenced by Inman or
somebody with similar views. In the first
scenario a hypothetical
(142)
US Defense Secretary is, `in December 1994',
gloating to his subordinates, that 'after the US
succeeded to force North Korea to limit its
nuclear programme, and after its first success
in negotiations with Iran concerning the same
matter, "we must now concentrate all our
attention on India. Pakistan and Israel. Since
our dispute with the CIA is not yet resolved, I
decided to instruct the Defense Intelligence
Agency to begin gathering independent
information about advances in Israeli nuclear
armaments, so that after subjecting the data to
our analysis, we would provide the President
with our well-informed assessment of the
situation". Then the former Admiral cleaned his
glasses, laughing sardonically. "Although the
person responsible for the conclusive
Intelligence evaluation is their friend, we can
at least show the Israelis that we have eyes and
ears."' It is fair to assume that had a US paper
published such a caricature of a hypothetical
Israeli Jewish defence minister, it would be
accused, not without reason, of anti-Semitism.
It is virtually certain, however, that no press
commentator in the US will accuse Oren of being
anti-Gentile.
The second horror scenario anticipates an
American attempt to use a spy aircraft to
photograph the Israeli nuclear installations in
Dimona `in January 1995' and Israeli hesitations
over whether to bring it down. If Israel does
bring down the plane, it wi11 be sure to
antagonize the `Gentiles' [Goyim], even
worse than in the Liberty affair of 1967, when
Israel bombed the US warship Liberty inflicting
heavy casualties. The scenarios lead Oren to the
conclusion that, due to Inman's resignation,
`the ghastly anticipations are not going to
materialize'. The first scenario can no longer
take place, because `by the coming December or
at any other time the post of the US Defense
Secretary can no more be held by the
intelligence expert former Admiral Bobby Ray
Inman.' More significantly, at the end of his
article Oren says that if the US administration
ever `weighs the utility of Dimona against the
utility of American support of any other states,
the Israeli government is sure to call up a
general mobilization of all its friends in
Washington. Israel will be pleased at such time
about each of its enemies no longer in position
to influence the administration or the Congress
but also feel sorry about each Pollard and each
"Liberty" [affair] for which it has ever
been responsible. It will not regret Inman's
absence, in spite of the fears that the latter
may voice his views in the US media.'
Let me proceed to Karni. He says that
`Inman's candidacy for the post of the Defense
Secretary has raised the gravest apprehensions
of the Israelis and the Jews.' It is reasonable
to suppose that when saying `the Jews' Karni
really means only those `American Jews' whom I
defined as 'organized'. It is also reasonable to
suppose that the organized American Jews did not
remain idle when they had their `gravest
apprehensions', but did something
(143)
concrete to relieve them, which means that
they did play a role in events leading to
Inman's resignation. When discussing the role of
the New York Times columnist, William Safire,
whom Inman named his main enemy, Karni says:
`Satire is but one in a group of Jewish
columnists and publishers who wield enormous
influence over the American media, and who are
prepared to automatically defend every Israeli
policy measure, except for the peace initiative
of the Rabin government which they were quick to
condemn and to consign to the grave.'
Both Oren and Karni are nevertheless under no
illusion that Inman is the only `enemy' left in
the US Defense and Intelligence establishment.
Karni provides a whole list of US Defense
Secretaries whom he defines as mischievously
hostile to Israel, among whom he names Caspar
Weinberger as the most pernicious. He even
attempts to draw a 'sociological profile' of an
American Gentile who in his view is likely to
become an `enemy'. Apparently Karni is a unaware
that in drawing such `profiles' he follows in
the footsteps of anti-Semites (and other
xenophobes) who also used to draw `profiles' of
Jews with the same purpose in their minds. It
can be nevertheless presumed that his `profile'
originates with sources close to Israeli
Intelligence. It reads as follows: `The personal
profile of Inman is from the Israeli point of
view unpromising. He is a white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant, graduate of the best universities, a
member of the elite clubs. He represents the
kind of personality more similar to George Bush
or James Baker than to Ronald Reagan.'
Oren is more subtle than Karni in his
description of Inman's 'personality': `In spite
of the absence of Inman in the future,
Washington (and Texas even more) is still
saturated with people born in provincial towns
during the hard times. Such people tend to be
motivated to rise up via the military services,
most often via service in the Navy. Inman is
merely one of such characters. Ross Perot is
another, and one of their allies [he doesn't
say who] is similar. Inman and Perot are
highly intelligent and sly, but they have
inferiority feelings due to their failure to
achieve anything of significance. Whenever an
individual of this type becomes a candidate for
the US presidency or for a position which in the
scale of authority almost approaches the
presidency, such as the position of Defense
Secretary, the problem becomes not just an
domestic American one, but a global one. When an
incumbent of either post perceives himself as a
victim of an Israeli or Jewish plot, Israel
cannot treat it as a joke.'
We can see how certain Americans are a priori
defined by Israel (and by organized American
Jews) as `undesirable', or worse, at least when
they occupy positions of authority. For a
comparison, it is worthwhile to quote Oren about
the biography of a `desirable'
(144)
American, namely William Safire: William
Safire loyally served an anti-Semitic president,
Nixon, because he was free to be more impressed
by Israeli military might, long before he became
a New York Times columnist. Safire's best
friend, the CIA Chief, William Casey, was at the
beginning of Reagan's administration forced to
accept Inman as his Deputy ... Fortunately,
Safire didn't regard his New York Times columns
as equivalent to a monastery. An Israeli who
toward the end of the 1970s served in Washington
and was then year after year invited to Safire's
home for a meal ending the Yom Kippur fast, was
surprised to discover that the number of
Safire's guests, all Jewish with high standing
cither in politics or Washington's media, was
increasing each year. There was even talk that
no one not born of a Jewish mother or converted
to Judaism according to Halacho would be
admitted to Safire's table, even though it meant
that Henry Kissinger, if invited, would have to
choose between his wife (who is a Gentile]
and Safire. Inman knew that Safire always worked
in tandem with Casey and that Casey always
worked in tandem with Israel. Casey's relatively
authoritative biography informs us that in the
spring of 1981 he met Yitzhak Hofi, then Mossad
Chief, for the purpose of making a deal. Casey
undertook to provide [Israel] wich
satellite-derived information about the Iraqi
nuclear reactor, in return for Hofi's
undertaking to restrain AIPAC in its opposition
against the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi
Arabia. Some time later Safire vociferously
denounced the restrictions imposed by Inman on
automatic transmission [to Israel] of
American intelligence information about Iraq and
Libya.' Incidentally, the terms of the deal
between Casey and Hofi conclusively prove that
AIPAC (and presumably other American Jewish
organizations as well) operates under the
command of Mossad, and that it could be used by
the Israeli government just as it uses
Mossad.
Yedior Ahronot's correspondents Tzadok
Yehezkeli and Danny Sadeh (30 January), write in
their review of the previously mentioned book
Critical Mass that `Israel solicits money from
wealthy Jews from all over the world for
financing its nuclear weapons programs. This
fundraising drive is directed by a committee
comprised of 30 Jewish millionaires.' As usual,
Jewish exclusivism and chauvinism are here
exploited by Israel as a major tool of its
policies. The impact of this practice can be a
matter for discussion, but denials of its very
existence, let alone denials of the right to
discuss this matter, are in my view not only
intellectually and morally offensive, but also
preclude any informed inquiry into both Middle
Eastern and American politics.
Karni clarifies that the mentioned
restrictions imposed by Inman applied only to
automatic sharing of all information. Israel
could still make specific requests for
information, however, which could
(145)
be either approved or rejected, but which
seem to have in most cases been approved. What
apparently irked Safire and his Jewish pals, was
the very fact that Israel had to request
information from the US. Karni nevertheless says
chat information about what was going on `within
the radius of 250 miles from the Israeli borders
continued to be automatically shared with
Israel'. According to him, a problem appeared
`in 1982 when Yasser Arafat moved his residence
from Beirut to Tunis, thus leaving the area
within which all information from the American
[satellite] cameras was to be instantly
passed on to Israel'. This was the reason for
Israel's displeasure with the 250-mile
limitation. In all probability, this limitation
was eventually rectified. Still, as long as it
existed, the 250-mile radius meant that
information was automatically conveyed to Israel
about goings on in all of Jordan, hefty chunks
of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, and part of
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, countries like Libya
or Pakistan lay outside the area in question,
which worried the Israelis, especially since
automatic transmission of intelligence from
outside of the radius was discontinued after the
Israelis destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor.
Karni informs us, I believe accurately, that
`what particularly worried Jerusalem was that
Inman didn't convey to Israel any information
about the nuclear projects of Iran and
Pakistan.' In my view the anti-Iraqi posture of
Israel was a momentary deviation from the
consistent pattern of seeking to maintain good
relations with Saddam Hussein, in recognition
that Israel's main enemies have been first Iran
and, next in line, Pakistan, for the simple
reason that both states are bigger and stronger
than Iraq.
Let me again quote in this context Tzadok
Yehezkeli's and Danny Sadeh's review of Critical
Mass in Yediot Ahronot (30 January 1994). They
write that `Israel is ever ready to launch its
nuclear missiles on 60 to 80 targets. Those
targets include sites in the Gulf, the capitals
of all Arab states, some nuclear bases on the
territory of the former USSR and some sites in
Pakistan.' (I am convinced this is accurate.) It
means that Israel must very much want to obtain
US satellite information about the targeted
area, a not-so-negligible part of the earth's
surface. The existence of so formidable a
nuclear power in Israel's hands cannot be
convincingly attributed to its own research and
development efforts nor to its role as a tool of
American policies. On the contrary, a nuclear
power of that magnitude must be presumed to run
counter to US imperial interests. It is also
doubtful, to say the least, if Israel by itself
ever had the money for constructing nuclear
power of this size, even when US financial help
is taken into consideration. Nor can nuclear
power of this extent be explained away by the
usual excuse of `guarding against threats to
Israel's very existence' or by nauseating misuse
of the memories of the Holocaust. The only
plausible explanation of the extent of Israeli
nuclear power is that
(146)
Israel acquired it with at least some help of
its `Jewish friends' in the US and of some
Jewish millionaires all over the world.
Yehezkeli's and Sadeh's information about `the
nuclear bases on the territory of the former
USSR' fits well with what Geoffrey Aronson,
relying on US State Department sources, reveals
about the Pollard affair in the Christian
Science Monitor (27 January). He writes that
according to `unanimous response' from these
sources, what Pollard had betrayed were `this
country's most important secrets', namely
`information relating to the US targeting of
Soviet nuclear and military installations and
the capabilities and defences of these sites'.
This seems in accord with Israel's global
aspirations based on the extenc of its nuclear
power. Aronson's sources say that much of che
intelligence passed on by Pollard `was unusable
by the Israelis except as bargaining chips and
leverage against Ihe United States and other
countries' interests'. In view of this fact
Aronson conjectures that Pollard's intelligence
was used by Israel for deals with Moscow
consisting of `trading nuclear secrets for
Soviet Jews'.
Oren, who is a firm believer in Jewish
influence on US policies (even if perhaps not as
firm as Markus), provides some examples of its
exercise that have to do with the person of
Inman. Here, I quote him verbatim, interspersing
the quotes with my own comments. 'Although Inman
behaved with fairness and propriety towards
Mossad and the Central Gathering Unit of
Military Intelligence [of the Israeli
Army], the shadow of the Liberty affair
could always be sensed in the background. In the
early 1960s, Inman had been a research and
operation officer serving on behalf of
[US] Navy Intelligence in the NSA
[National Security Agency], which ran
Liberty and its sister ships. The NSA was
subordinated to the Pentagon and not to the CIA.
It dealt with tactical intelligence, including
the trailing of Soviet ships, but not with
strategic intelligence. The US Navy has never
reconciled itself to the closure of the Liberty
file after its destruction by the Israeli Air
Force, and has always perceived the timing of
the Israeli attack as evidence chat Israel did
it deliberately, in order to conceal from the
Americans its decision to conquer the Golan
Heights before a cease-fire could be put into
effect through an American-Soviet agreement.'
(This appraisal of Israeli intentions strikes me
as perfectly accurate.) `True, Rabin, the then
(Israeli] Chief of Staff, learned about this
decision only after Dayan suddenly changed his
mind from opposing to supporting the plan of
that conquest, and issued orders to this effect
directly to the Commander of the Northern
Command, passing Rabin by. But Inman also
recalls how three years later [in 1970]
Dayan didn't hesitate to threaten the Americans
openly and directly, telling them that if they
ever dared to send a photo-taking aircraft over
the Israeli bank of the Suez Canal, he was going
to order to down it.' Let me comment, first,
that I find Oren's
(147)
information's perfectly accurate, and second,
that I find it most significant that the US,
possibly due to the influence of Safire and
Kissinger over Nixon, then gave in to Dayan's
threats so supinely.
`During the Liberty, affair and thereafter,
including the time when the CIA ship Pueblo was
captured (but not destroyed) by the North
Koreans, Inman was chief of the Department of
Current Intelligence of the Navy's Pacific
Command. He learned a lot there, enough to
disbelieve in coincidences or at least in their
frequent occurrence. This is why, while serving
as a NSA chief during Carter's administration he
refused to attribute to coincidence two other
facts he then learned about. He first learned
that the Carter administration had agreed under
pressure to the appointment of Colonel Shlomo
Inbar as the Israeli military attaché in
Washington. That Inbar - previously the head of
Research and Development in the
[Israeli] Security System, then
Commander of Communication Division [of the
Israeli Army] and finally Commander of the
Central Gathering Unit of the Military
Intelligence [of the Israeli Army] -
told directly his American visitors that
providing Israel with any secret information it
requests would lie in the best American interest
because "anything you would refuse to share with
us we will steal anyway."'
`The pig-headed Americans didn't then grasp
the Israeli sense of humour. They understood it
only when a Navy Intelligence employee, Jonathan
Pollard, was caught red-handed while passing on
to Israel precisely this kind of information
which Inman had decided to withhold from Israel.
Nevertheless, some Americans interpreted the
link [between Inbar's words and Pollard's
deeds] as purely coincidental. And
interpreted likewise as coincidental were the
links connecting Rafi Eitan, then the chief of
the Ofiice for Scientific Contacts (LEKEM), who
employed Pollard, with the [Israeli]
Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, who had
appointed Eitan and who rushed to Washington in
order to complain against Inman and his
orders.'
Karni recounts two more curious coincidences.
The first is that among those to whom Sharon
`complained' against Inman was no one else but
Safire. The second is that shortly afterwards
`Lieutenant-Colonel Aviam Selah was sent to the
US for a lecture tour sponsored by the United
Jewish Appeal and the Israeli Bonds
organization. He turned out to he one of the
pilots who destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor,
relying on American satellite information in the
process. Selah once delivered a lecture to a
group of stockmarket brokers, all of them
Jewish, in the office of one such broker,
William Stern. Stem was very impressed by Selah,
in a way in which the American Jews typically
tend to be impressed by Israelis who posture as
war heroes and have photogenic cheeks. He was so
impressed by Selah, that he rushed in great
excitement to tell his
(148)
cousin all about him. That cousin happened to
be a junior officer in the US Naval Intelligence
and his name was Jonathan Pollard. Pollard
shared the excitement and asked to meet Selah.'
Karni is biased in favour of Pollard and willing
to twist evidence accordingly, due to which the
sequel of his story brings nothing new.
Nevertheless his story of a quickly arranged
meeting between an Israeli lieutenant-colonel on
a busy tour and an American Jew working for US
Intelligence bears in my view all the marks of
truth.
Oren continues: 'But Eitan ran Pollard with
the explicit approval of four Defence Ministers
and Prime Ministers, concretely Arens, Rabin,
Shamir and Peres. The details of this affair
must be known, among others, to General Danny
Yatom [now the Commander of the Central
Command], who at that time served as
military secretary to Arens and Rabin and who in
that capacity was drafting the minutes of their
conversations with Eitan. All such individuals
know how to use the rhetoric of the importance
of the US support for Israel, but they also know
what to do in order to risk the loss of that
support. Of course, owing only to another
fortunate coincidence, the (secret Israeli]
Inquiry Committee headed by [the former
Mossad Chief] Tzvi Tzur and Yehoshua
Rotenstreich found it possible to absolve all
[Israeli] politicians of all
responsibility for the Pollard affair and to put
all the blame on LEKEM functionaries.' Tzur was
subsequently appointed as the Chairman of the
Directors of the (Israeli] `Aviation
Industries', owned by the Israeli government,
and considered one of the most desirable
government jobs in Israel. Rotenstreich already
then held the post of the Chairman of the
Censorship Committee, where he always was siding
with the government. Rafi Eitan was not
forgotten either. After helping sell Iraqi oil
all over the world, he now oversees Israeli
trade with Cuba and some of its agricultural
development.
This story shows that Israel, by skilfully
exploiting its influence within the US, manages
to steer very far from becoming an American
satellite. Sure, the fact that Israel has its
value for American imperial interests also
contributes to the same effect. This explains
why, in spite of Israel's financial, and now
lesser political dependence on the US, Israel
can often afford to provoke the US in a manner
that may be crude and arrogant. Oren understands
that Israel's relative independence should not
be undermined by crass displays of Israel's
brashness but only because avoidance of such
displays helps Israel maintain its independence
more effectively. In his view, which, as will be
shown below, is shared by the entire Israeli
establishment, the extent of Israeli
independence can be tested, indeed has already
been demonstrated above: that if the US
administration ever `weighs the utility of
Dimona as against the utility of American
support of any other states, the Israeli
government is sure to call up a general
mobilization of all its friends
(149)
in Washington'. The two crucial areas which
Israel wants to maintain its independence from
the US are its nuclear power and its influence
within the US itself.
The Inman affair and the publication of
Critical Mass has brought the issue of Israeli's
relative independence from the US into sharp
focus. It would be instructive to review some
past manifestations of this independence
together with their impact upon regional
politics. Let me begin with some quotations from
what the Hebrew press wrote about Israeli
nuclear power in 1991. Even then, boasts about
Israeli nuclear power could be seen as a
response to Bush's attempts to somehow limit
lsrael's options in nuclear, and perhaps also
missile, development. That response was
described by the chief political commentator of
Haaretz Uzi Benziman (31 May 1992). He
attributed it, though, not straight to Shamir or
Arens, but only to their `underlings', who
`vented all their wrath at [Bush's] plan
without even bothering to get acquainted with
all its details ... [They] saw Bush's
initiative as dangerous, amateurish, retlecting
[Bush's] arrogance ... Laborites such as
Rabin, were unanimous in unconditionally
rejecting Bush's initiative, differing at best
over how their rejection should be phrased.'
Benziman explains it: `The fierceness with which
the entire power elite of the State of Israel
reacted to the new ideas of Bush cannot come as
a surprise. Bush hit our softest spot. When he
proposes to freeze the proliferation of weapons
he is interpreted as trying to deprive us of our
soul, of the last asset we have. When he
proposes to prohibit installation of long-range
ground-to-ground missiles he is perceived as
threatening our very survival.'
Out of the important articles published in
mid-October 1991 in Haaretz let me quote from
those by Ze'ev Shifl' (15 October) and the
nuclear expert Avner Yaniv (16 October). Shiff,
admitting that he reflected the official Israeli
viewpoint wrote: `Whoever believes that Israel
eve: will sign the [UN] Convention
prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons
... is daydreaming. There are no misgivings in
Israel about the need to reject this convention
with all firmness.' Yaniv substantiated the same
conclusion by recounting the history of nuclear
negotiations between the US and Israel from
Kennedy's time. He wrote, `in so far as this
subject matter is concerned the past is quite a
reliable guide to prospects for the future.'
According to Yaniv, `Kennedy was no less
determined to prevent Israel from acquiring
nuclear weapons than Bush is now.' But `both
Kennedy and Johnson failed in all they wanted,
to the point that in the end they found
themselves, against their will helping lay
foundations for the subsequent close and
amicable cooperation between the US and Israel.'
He concluded that as long as Israel follows the
precedents of the past, the US, far from
(150)
imposing any nuclear limitations on Israel,
would be in the end bound to contribute to
Israel's nuclear strength.
Israel's insistence on the independent use of
its nuclear weapons can be seen as the
foundation on which Israeli grand stra2egy
rests. The Oslo process changed nothing in this
respect. Yoel Markus (Haaretz, 1 February 1994)
quotes Rabin's first open reference to the
putative Iranian threat `made on 20 January 1993
while answering in the Knesset a question of MK
Efraim Sneh (Labor). Rabin said that "we are
following with concern the Iranian
nuclearization and attempts to develop
long-range ground-to-ground missiles." His
operational conclusion was that "we should
precipitate the peace process in order to create
an international machinery capable of responding
to the Iranian threat."' Markus disapproves of
what he interprets as Israeli threats to use
Israeli nuclear weapons against Iran in the
relatively near future. Obviously relying on the
best Israeli Army and Intelligence sources
rather than on his own understanding, he
provides an estimate of `Iranian political aims
[which] can be assumed to be ordered in
importance as follows: A. Systematic conquest of
oilfields. B. Undermining the present Arab
regimes in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and of course, the subjugation of
the Palestinian entiry to itself with help of
Hamas. [The absence of the Syrian regime
from this list is conspicuous.] C. The
ultimate unification of 900 million Muslims of
the world under its command, with a single
theology imposed on all of them.' The difference
between Markus' views and the policies Israel is
now said by him to pursue is timing. In his view
the time to fight Iran will come if and when the
aboveestimated Iranian aims are achieved: `In
the long range, if Iran ever comes close to
fulfilment of its dreams io tum all Islamic
states, from Algeria to Turkestan, into a single
Khomeinistic empire, Israel would have good
reasons to feel keenly concerned.'
There are good reasons for assuming that for
the Israeli Security System in general and for
Shimon Peres in particular the `peace process'
is conceived of primarily as a tool to promote
such mad strategies. The best recent summary of
Peres' policies has been provided by Aluf Ben
writing in Haaretz (23 January 1994). According
io Ben, Peres agrees with `the heads of the
Security System' that `at present there exist
two main threats to Israeli and Middle Eastern
security', namely `fundamentalist Islam and
nuclear weaponry, in particular when held by
Iran. But', continues Ben, `unlike the heads of
the Security System, Peres does not want Israel
to rely on the defensive, deterrent and
offensive power of the Israeli Army alone, but
wants to overhaul the [Israeli] concept
of security'. His idea is that in the coming era
of peace `Israel should be recognized as a
legitimate player on the Middle Eastern
playground', in the position to exploit its
legitimacy for the sake
(151)
of promoting its grand strategy. According to
Peres, in the Middle East there is no room for
nuclear deterrence as it was used in the Cold
War, because `the enemies of Israel are not as
rational as the rulers of the US and the USSR
were, to the point that under The influence of
the Ayatollahs they may court disasters for the
entire world.' Let me recall in this context how
in 1984 Peres saved the career of that paragon
of rationality, Ariel Sharon, and how he was
sustaining for years that ultra-rational
movement, the Gush Emunim. And he still
main2ains fairly good relations with both.
According to Ben, Peres proposes that Israel
establishes `a regional alliance system which
will operate as a single political entity', and
which `will be powerful'. But `in contrast to
NATO, which limited its aims to defending its
members against the external Soviet threat,
Peres' regional alliance system is meant to
defend the countries of the Middle East from
themselves, that is from the internal seeds of
destruction, instability, religious and ethnic
zealotry and the economic competition between
its constituent parts.' Although Ben tends to
agree with Peres' ideas, still, for the sake of
clarity he comments: `Only one question Peres
let remain unanswered: what will 6e the future
of the Israeli nuclear arsenal which Peres has
so often boasted he helped create?' In my view
there are many questions which `Peres let remain
unanswered', for example the obvious question
about the geographical 6oundaries of the area to
be included in his `regional alliance system'.
Obviously, the states listed by Markus as
threatened by Iran are planned to be included.
But what about Syria and Iran, even after the
`regional alliance system' settles its accounts
with them? And what about Pakistan on which, as
mentioned above, Israel's nuclear missiles are
now targeted? It would be instructive io recall
in this context that toward the end of 1981,
Sharon made a public speech in which he
cheerfully proposed that Israel's influence
extend `from Mauritania to Afghanistan'. When so
defined, the area may include Pakistan. In my
view it can be reliably assumed that strategic
aims which Sharon defined in so brutal a manner
are the same as those pursued by Peres though
the `peace process'.
Ben doesn't try to answer the question about
`the future of the Israeli nuclear arsenal'. He
says that in Peres' view `the "fog" enveloping
the [Israeli] nuclear plans is a factor
strengthening Israeli deterrence.' In my view
there cannot be any doubt that plans for `Peres'
regional alliance system' rest on the Israeli
monopoly of nuclear weapons and has two aims,
one offensive and the other defensive. The
former is to fight Iran and its allies such as
Syria, unless it passes over to the pro-Israeli
camp. The latter is to preserve the status quo
in the Middle East by protecting all regimes not
labeled `fundamentalist'. Incidentally, since
according to Peres, Israel's strategic aim is to
maintain the existing regimes intact, `the
(152)
abolition of the economic competition' as
envisaged by Peres can be presumed to be
effected not through the mechanism of
referendums and parliamentary elections, but
through a diktat, in all probability backed by
the Israeli nuclear monopoly.
The plans of Peres imply a considerable
Israeli emancipation from its dependence on the
US (and marginally on Europe). In that respect
they differ from the views of `the heads of the
Security System' and from Israeli foreign
relations as pursued to date. Some implications
of Peres' views and of his disagreements with
the Israeli commanders are clarified in another
article by Amir Oren (Davar, 4 February 1994).
Oren claims that `by choosing the channel of
Oslo' as top priority for the pursuit of Israeli
policies `Peres gambled by staking a lot on the
PLO' as `against staking on the US', because he
expected the PLO to help establish the `regional
alliance system'. According to Oren, this
explains Peres' indifference to the progress of
peace negotiations with Syria, in defiance of US
pressures to advance them. But The order of
priorities of `the chiefs of the
[Israeli] Security' is quite different.
Their top priority is `to sever Syria's
connection with all too many threats [to
Israel] originating from Iran'. Oren quotes
the commander of the Air Force, General
Budinger, who last week said that the F-15-A
warplanes which Israel had recently obtained
from the US, in addition to `their ability to
fly to Iran and back without refuelling', could
also `operate efficiently within 50 per cent of
the radius of their maximal outreach'. As Oren
admits, this means the F-15-A warplanes `will be
able to penetrate deep into Syrian territory,
and cruise there for quite a while in search of
their targets, whereas lower quality warplanes
could at best bomb a target upon reaching it and
then be forced to quickly return to Israel'.
But, continues Oren, `this capability, though
important, is still not as important as the
capability of a F15-A warplane to reach Tehran
and rain on it bombs which can improve the
hearing of Iranian decision-makers.' The Israeli
generals, whose views Oren can be presumed to
echo also 'rely on security arrangements agreed
upon with Jordan more than on any deals which
could be made with a Palestinian entity'. Their
criticism of Peres (described by Oren in detail
but omitted here) and of his way of negotiating
with Arafat is according to Oren attributable to
much deeper differences over strategy, such as
described here.
The idea of a `regional alliance system'
implies the exclusion of the US from it and
Israel's supremacy within it, backed by the
latter's nuclear monopoly. Its avowed goal `to
secure peace in the region' resembles all too
closely similar claims of the imperial powers of
the past, made for the consumption of the
gullible. This is why Peres' plan can be viewed
as an extreme version of Israeli imperialism.
The nature of the relations between Israel and
other states of the `regional alliance system'
is described in another article by A1uf Ben
(153)
(Haarezz, 11 February 1994). Ben quotes the
first director of the Israeli Institute for
Development of Weaponry [RAFAEL], Munya
Mardoch, that `the moral and political meaning
of nuclear weapons is that states which renounce
their use are acquiescing to the status of
vassal states. All those states which feel
satisfied with possessing conventional weapons
alone are fated to become vassal states.' A
transparent implication of that view is that by
insisting on its nuclear monopoly, Israel aims
at reducing all other Middle Eastern states to
the status of its vassals, probably hoping for
approval of such a state of affairs by the
US.
Apart from the question of whether all
existing Arab regimes would want to join `an
alliance' so transparently stewarded by Israel,
one can also ask about the survivability of any
Arab regime joining that `alliance'. I feel
unable to answer this question. I am concerned,
however, more with a third question: whether the
US would be pleased by a unification of the
Middle East under Israel's command - it could
then influence this unified region only via its
influence on Israel. Let me recall that through
such unification, entailing an Israeli hegemony,
Israeli financial dependence on the US and
thereby the US's chances to influence Israel
would be diminished. It seems also doubtful
whether the US (or indeed Europe) would be
pleased with the abolition of `economic
competition' between states under `an alliance
system' powerful enough to accomplish it. This
is why Peres' plan can only be interpreted as
assuming that Israeli influence upon the US,
exerted through the medium of organized American
Jews, is sufficient to outweigh US imperial
interests. As I mentioned above, I do recognize
the power of organized American Jews as quite
formidable. But contrary to some Hebrew press
commentators, I don't believe that it is
sufficient to justify that tacit assumption of
Peres. The organized American Jewish community
may, as Oren hopes, succeed in protecting the
independence of Israeli nuclear policies 6ut I
doubt if they are capable of accomplishing much
more.
I hope I have succeeded in showing that the
role of `organized' Jews in the US in the affair
of Inman's resignation touches on the deepest
issues of Israeli grand strategy. I also hope I
make it clear that the Peres' plans are in my
view not only immoral and crudely imperialist,
but also downright unrealistic, no matter how
enthusiastic western commentators are about him.
They represent an Israeli expansionist's utopia.
In my view the plans of Peres are more morally
reprehensible than the plans of the Israeli
Security System: more nauseously hypocritical,
and more pregnant with more disastrous
consequences for the entire Middle East if any
attempt is ever made to bring them about. I
consider the imperial plans of the Israeli
generals to be at least implementable, primarily
because they pose less of a threat to the
imperial interests of the US. Still,
(154)
those plans are also symptomatic in that they
reflect two most Part V cherished Israeli
ambitions: the ambition to reduce its dependence
on the US, especially in the nuclear domain, and
the ambition to exploit their thus enhanced
independence for the pursuance of Israeli grand
strategies. Peres' plans articulate those two
ambitions in the most extremist manner possible.
But what is most dangerous are the ambitions
themselves rather than any of their
articulations.
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