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5
Israeli
Foreign Policy after the Oslo Accord
1
November 1993
The right word to describe the
thirty-year-old dependence of Israeli policies
an the US was coined by Davar's political
commentator Daniel Ben-Simon, who speaks of the
`former American tutelage' of Israel (18 October
1993). Ben-Simon's view is correct when he says
that `until quite recently Israeli foreign
policy was carried out according to the rules
imposed by the State Department and the White
House. Nothing was done in defiance of those
rules. All former peace initiatives in the
Middle East were launched by the Americans.' Yet
Ben-Simon also says that `the Oslo Accord put
Israel's patron to shame. While chiefs of the
State Department were busily overseeing the
progress of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in
Washington, Rabin and Peres closed the deal in
distant Oslo. The US was notified of the Accord
barely a few days before its finalization, as a
gesture to spare them an overt insult, and in
order to make it still possible for them to
disburse money needed for its
implementation.'
His conclusion, with which I again concur, is
that `the main loser from this rapid increase in
the Israeli power of diplomatic manoeuvre is the
US. The Accord with the PLO which generated
sympathy for Israel has also made it more
confident of its power than it ever was.'
Commenting on this new sell confidence,
Ben-Simon elaborates that `some factions of
major importance within Israeli establishment
are quite satisfied with this weakening of the
American tutelage', but `Rabin does not belong
to them. Regardless of gains in the independence
of Israeli policies, he still feels that the
American protective umbrella over Israel is the
best guarantee of its security.' Right now,
however, Israeli foreign policy is noticeably
different from what it was before, increasingly
aiming at getting rid of `American tutelage'.
This change, placed in a broader historical
context, will be described here.
The politically prodigious and financially
unprecedented support which Israel was receiving
from the US since the early 1960s until this
year has actually never determined Israeli
policies entirely. To begin with, it superseded
the period of frequent conflicts between
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the US and Israel in the 1950s. These
conflicts flared up during the Suez affair of
1956 when Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw
unconditionally not only from Sinai but also
from the Gaza Strip. Since the early 1960s,
however, Israel has wielded tremendous influence
within the US, and it was capable of turning
that influence to its advantage. Owing to this,
`American tutelage' has never worked perfectly,
as Israel did occasionally pursue policies not
in accord with US interests. Even more than
that: by exploiting its influence on the
Congress and the US media, Israel could
occasionally force the US administration to
reverse its policies completely. When the Carter
administration announced its accord with the
USSR as its policy programme for the Middle
East, which was not to the taste of the Begin
government, the latter dispatched its then
Foreign Minister, Dayan to the US. Within three
days, Dayan succeeded in making the Carter
administration ignominiously reverse itself.
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David
negotiations, the Israeli-Egyptian peace and the
1982 invasion of Lebanon can all be seen as
contingent upon Dayan's humiliation of Carter in
this affair.
Israel's economic situation and its standing
within the international community can also be
reasonably supposed to affect the degree of
Israeli dependence on the US. Whenever Israel is
in financial straits (whether for economic or
other reasons) and whenever its relations with
other great powers are strained, its dependence
on the US cannot but be on the rise. But
whenever the Israeli government and the Israeli
wealthy elite are financially well-off (even if
the Israeli poor then get poorer) Israel's
dependence on the US can be reduced, and Israel
can then assume a more independent policy
posture.
For example, the invasion of Lebanon resulted
in an Israeli conquest of a relatively large
territory and in Israel's deep involvement in
Lebanese domestic affairs. The invasion was made
possible by a long period of steady and enormous
increases in the size of the Israeli Defence
budgets, beginning in 1967 and continuing until
1984. But the occupation of Lebanon resulted in
a bloody guerilla war in which Israel was
defeated not only militarily but also
economically. Nehemya Strassler, writing in
Haaretz, (6 August) gave the following vivid
picture of the resultant economic situation: `By
the beginning of 1985 the Israeli economy was on
the verge of collapse, which could lead to a
collapse of Israeli democracy. The only way to
avert it was by stopping the hyperinflation. The
monthly inflation rate stood then at 15 per
cent. The economy was in a shambles, the dollar
reserves were already almost spent. The
situation was grievous enough to make the
Treasury contemplate the imposition of quotas on
all imports to stave off the vanishing of all
hard currency.' Being in such a
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shambles, Israel was shunned by all major
Third World states. Given such realities,
Israel's dependence on the US couldn't but stand
at its highest.
In my view, this state of affairs continued
until 1992, all the shows of the Shamir
government's defiance of the US notwithstanding.
The Madrid Conference was convened through
American efforts and was run openly by the US.
In contrast to that, the signing of the Accord
on principles on the White House lawn belonged
in a show-business category, constituting a
facade behind which we machinations were done by
Israel without US knowledge or involvement. In
contrast to 1985, the Israeli government now has
plenty of money, due to US military aid of
unprecedented magnitude granted by the Bush
administration during and after the GulfWar, and
to guarantees granted by the Clinton
administration which are hardly used for their
avowed purpose of helping absorb the Jewish
immigrants from the former USSR. The fact of
their being used for other purposes can best be
seen from long lines of those immigrants before
the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv looking forward
to their return to Russia.
This is why the present situation is very
different. Ben-Simon quotes the
[Israeli] Foreign Minister, Shimon
Peres, as saying that `Israeli diplomacy extends
all over the world. Israeli representatives are
now welcomed in almost every capital and
regarded by the international community as its
equal members ... Rabin's recent journey to
Indonesia can be seen as the culmination of this
process of breaking the anti-Israeli taboos.
After all, Indonesia is the largest Muslim state
in the world, and yet Rabin's visit there was
public. After the duly publicized deep Israeli
penetration into China and India, Indonesia
symbolizes the most radical change in Israel's
international status.'
Israel also expects to profit from trade with
countries such as China, even if such trade
links displease the US. Of course, Israel is
vitally interested in maintaining its influence
upon the Clinton administration so as to prevent
any reduction in the present levels of American
aid and any serious US protest against its
independent policy ventures. Israeli
independence can work as long as Clinton remains
ready to finance (or press other countries to
finance) that 'independence'. Unless Israel soon
acquires its own sources of income, its
emancipation from American tutelage will remain
contingent on the weakness and crassness of
Clinton's foreign polices and on the recent
remarkable gains in influence of organized US
Jews upon his administration. The situation in
this respect was well sumarized by Haaretz
correspondent Orri Nir who reported (6 July)
that `Clinton feels committed to the Jewish vote
and even more to Jewish campaign donations', and
that his administration `has ~ firm "Jewish
connection"'.
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Whatever financial benefits Israel expects to
derive from its foreign policy ventures, their
chief aim undoubtedly remains the neutralization
of the power of Iran. To all appearances, Israel
would like to overthrow the present Iranian
regime and replace it with another one, upon
which Israel could maintain an influence
comparable to that it had upon the regime of the
late Shah. It is again Ben-Simon who described
it aptly: 'There is a latent factor behind
Rabin's visits to two major countries on his
route, that is, China and Indonesia. It is the
Israeli fear of Iran. Once the Israeli top
establishment came to the conclusion that Iran
is the most dangerous enemy not just of Israel
but of the entire Middle East, it has spared no
efforts to disseminate this conviction abroad.
Before departing to China the Prime Minister
said that the real purpose of his visit was to
explain to his hosts how terrible was the danger
posed by Iran to the entire Middle East. "I
intend to clarify to them how dangerous Islamic
fundamentalism is, not just to Israel and all
its neighbours, but also to the world at large",
said Rabin in his interview with Davar, only one
day before he embarked for China.
`China is one of the main suppliers of
weaponry to Iran, so the Prime Minister had a
good reason to concentrate on this topic during
his recent tour. For the same reason Israel has
opened the channels for the talks with North
Korea, without bothering about the angry
response of the US administration to them. The
purpose was to do everything possible to halt
the non-conventional [that is, nuclear]
arming of Iran. For this purpose, Israel is now
willing to talk to any state, so as to leave
Iran to its own devices, or at least to decrease
its receiving any non-conventional armament
supplies from anywhere in the world.' It can be
taken for granted that in regard to Iran, Israel
wants more than `leaving it to its own devices'.
Nevertheless, it is perfectly credible that
stirring up any conceivable country against Iran
remains the guiding principle of the new and
independent Israeli policies.
The case of North Korea may not be the most
important, but it is typical. It was described
by Nahum Barnea in Yediot Ahronot on 20 August,
that is before the signing of the Accord with
the PLO. Barnea informs us that in its `talks
with North Korea conducted by the Deputy
Director of the Foreign Ministry, Eitan Bentzur,
Israel asked for stopping the sales of the North
Korean Scuds to Iran and Syria. Like so many
backward regimes, the North Koreans firmly stick
to the myth of the Protocols of the Elders of
Zion. From this myth they draw a conclusion that
via Israel they can easily win some access to
America, and that this access may perhaps rescue
their regime in an hour of dire emergency.'
Complicated as the deal was, it was almost
finalized. There was a third party to it, namely
`a Canadian bank, friendly to Israel, very
interested in the project.
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The bank proposed to consider an investment
of $500 million on the sole condition that the
North Koreans sever all relations with Iran.'
The expression `friendly to Israel' may be
safely presumed to mean that it was controlled
by Mossad. The readers of the Hebrew press
realize that at least since the 1960s Israeli
foreign affairs are quite often run with the
help of financial institutions or individual
wealthy businessmen, usually but not necessarily
Jewish, who act on orders from Mossad as a quid
pro quo for the state of Israel's support for
their private business deals. This was the
pattern to be observed in the Irangate
affair.
But let me return to the story of the deal
with North Korea. The secret negotiations were
first discovered by the Japanese, who `became
enraged and made a scandal' but had no power to
stop them: `It had already been arranged that
Bentzur was soon to meet the daughter of the
almighty North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung and
close the deal. The daughter is third in the
North Korean hierarchy, right after the son.' At
the same time `the Americans claimed that they
had opened negotiations with North Korea on the
nuclear issue. Consequently, they were upset
over Israel's messing up. The Deputy of the
National Defence Council Sandy Berger and the
Deputy State Secretary Peter Tarnoff put
pressure on Christopher to drive Israel away
from North Korea. They argued that they
themselves could press North Korea to sever its
relations wiih Iran.' Probably because this
happened right before the finalization and
publication of the Oslo Accord, the Israeli
government reluctantly agreed to cancel the deal
with North Korea. Barnea draws two conclusions
from that affair. The first is that
`unfortunately, Israel does not believe that for
the US Iran is as important as it is for
Israel.' It can be construed as meaning that if
Israel's primary aim is to neutralize the
Iranian power, Israel needs to get rid of the
American tutelage, at least to some extent.
Barnea's second conclusion is that `the great
[Israeli] fear that other states may yet
realize that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion
are after all a myth - that the Jews do not rule
over the US, but the US rules over the Jews -
cannot be so easily dissipated. For if this
calamity indeed occurs, it is going to be
unbearable for us.' Indeed, the Israeli power
has two components: one real, based on its own
strength and its real influence within the US,
and the other imaginary, based on its
cultivation of anti-Semitic myths in various
countries. Especially under Clinton, these two
components are craftily blended.
The most important state whose interests
Israel is now advancing against (at least
avowed) US interests is Iraq. After many
previous hints to this effect in Hebrew press,
the well-informed veteran journalist Moshe Zak
brought the affair into the open in an article
entitled `Are we ready to make peace with Iraq?'
(Maariv,
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28 October). He thinks Israel is indeed
trying to establish friendly relations with
Saddam Hussein's regime, his evidence being the
words of Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres,
uttered in the course of an interview with the
leading Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram. Peres said
there that `Israel is ready to make peace with
any Middle Eastern state with the exception of
Iran.' Zak comments, 'Can this be true? Are we
ready to make peace with Saddam Hussein, in
defiance of sanctions imposed on him by all the
states of the world? Will Israel be involved in
an Iraqgate, responding to Iraq's frantic search
for a hole in the wall erected by the Free World
around Saddam Hussein?' Zak speaks of `an old
Israeli delusion' contributing to its siding
with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. His crucial
argument, however, is that any evidence of good
Israeli relations with Iraq will undermine
current Israeli efforts to convince states like
North Korea, China or `some European states' to
stop arming Iran. He nevertheless concludes his
article by formulating an argument in favour of
what in my view can only be interpreted as the
existence of an Israeli alliance with Iraq:
`Some Arab oil states have already suggested
through go-betweens that they may sell oil to
Israel even prior to the signing of the Accord
with the PLO. After discarding their erstwhile
delusions that the7 will ever be able to prevent
oil from reaching Israel, they arc already
prepared to se11 their oil tn any purchaser.
Therefore, Iraq's possible offer to sell oil to
Israel should not be regarded as worth risking a
political confrontation with the US. Iraq is not
doing us any favour by such an offer, whereas
for Israel the main thing is to keep
international solidarity with states fighting
terrorism.'
Let me comment here that Zak differs from
Peres about Israeli relations with Iraq only on
purely pragmatic grounds. For Zak, `a risk of a
political confrontation with the US' or the
persuasive power of Israeli arguments
vis-à-vis gangster states like China and
North Korea outweigh what in his view are
problematic benefits, derivable from purchasing
or reselling Iraqi oil. But Peres may know
better that under the Clinton administration the
US is not going co enter 'a political
confrontation' with Israel no matter what the
latter may do, or that an appeal to China or
North Korea on grounds of `international
solidarity' is bound to be useless. Since Zak
has never joined any anti-Iranian propaganda
campaign and since he writes under censorship
constraints, my impression is that he is genuine
in warning the Israelis against an alliance with
Iraq, but cannot fully disclose his real
arguments against it.
Israeli relations with Kenya and Eritrea seem
to belong to the same category as its relations
with Iraq. Hami Shalev and Yerah Tal report in
Haaretz on 18 October, that the main aim of
Rabin's visit to Kenya was `to coordinate ways
to prevent the intrusion of fundamentalist
Islamic forces into the Horn of Africa.
Highly
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