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3
Syrian
Cities and Relations with Saddam Hussein
24
September 1991
Numerous translations of mine from the Hebrew
press envision, from time to time, a
`pre-emptive' Israeli war as likely and as
directed against Syria, which has been long
regarded by Israel as its enemy number one.
Particularly relevant in this context is the 18
February 1991 speech by Yitzhak Rabin (as the
head of opposition) to the Labor Knesset
faction. Rabin's speech contained three crucial
points. The first point was that Israel was
doomed to live forever in war, or under the
threat of war with the entire Arab world, but at
this point of time especially with Syria. The
second was that in all its wars Israel `must
assume an essentially aggressive role, so as to
be in the position to dictate the terms of a
conclusion'. Prerequisite to that is `a further
increase of the offensive power of Israeli Air
and Armour forces needed to achieve a quick
victory'. The third was Rabin's criticism of
Arens (then the Defence Minister) for letting
Iraqi missiles hit Israel: `What had we told
them (the Arabs]? If you send missiles on
Tel Aviv, Damascus will be turned into a ruin.
If you send missiles also on Haifa, not only
Damascus but also Aleppo will cease to exist.
They will be destroyed root and branch. Without
dealing only with missile launchers, we will
devastate Damascus.' Various Israeli
commentators, e.g. Uzi Benziman and Reuven
Padatzur of Haaretz and Ya'akov Sharett of
Davar, understood these words as intended to
mean that Israel had already threatened Syria
(and other Arab countries as well) with
obliteration of its cities by nuclear
weapons.
Here I will describe what probably was the
first instance when the highest Israeli
authorities actually contemplated the razing of
four Syrian cities: Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and
Latakia. The story which occurred during the
October 1973 War is documented by Yigal Sama
(Yediot Ahronot, 17 September 1991). Sama's
facts are based on extensive documentation
supplied by Aryeh Brown, the then military
secretary of the Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan.
Sarna's article contains an interview with Brown
who defines himself as `loyal to Dayan, and
trusting his judgement fully, both
(47)
during that war and on other occasions'.
Significantly, Brown also says that he owed his
quick rise in rank to Dayan.
Sama's article appeared on the Eve of Yom
Kippur when analyses of the 1973 Yom Kippur War
are customarily published by the Hebrew press. I
Find it significant that no other Israeli war,
such as the War of Independence and the Six Day
War, duly commemorated as they are, receive even
a fraction of printed space which the history of
the 1973 War continues to receive. Sama himself
fought in that war as a tank commander on the
Syrian front. As for Sarna's personal attitude,
he says that together with `a whole generation
of Israelis, then traumatized to the core', he
has since that war `acquired a split personality
with half of it remaining in the past and the
second half facing the future'. This can mean
that the attitudes of the entire generation then
changed. As Sarna says, that generation `now
passes on the emotions then learned to their
sons'. All Israeli politics from 1973 can best
be understood as a reaction to the Yom Kippur
War. That reaction, however, may assume
antithetical directions.
The personality of Moshe Dayan needs to be
taken into account here. I have always been very
critical of Dayan, but I think that whatever can
be said of his politics, there can be little
doubt that, while the Israeli grand strategy
precedes his time, he was also a master
tactician, who invented the Israeli Army's
doctrine of deterrence, along with other
tactical innovations which still largely
determine the Israeli Army's strategies and
tactics, but above everything else in its
attitudes towards the Arabs. Just before October
1973 Dayan was at the peak of his popularity,
not only in Israel but also among the diaspora
Jews. His popularity rested in my view mainly on
his radiant confidence that Israel could retain
the Territories conquered in that war
indefinitely. He argued that the Arab states
either would not dare attack Israel, or, if they
did, their resounding defeat after a short war
was assured.
Already on the second day of the Yom Kippur
War (7 October), however, Dayan together with
all other Israeli leaders realized that the war
was going badly, w7th all their hopes for a
rapid victory dashed. As Brown recounts, they
nevertheless kept pretending to the Israelis as
well as to the whole world (including their
friend Henry Kissinger) that everything was
going on according to the Israeli Army's plans.
(A major carrier of this deception was Hayim
Herzog, then the chief TV commentator and now
President of the state.) The deception only
aggravated the situation.
As Brown recounts it, on 7 October, at 11:45
a.m., 'Moshe Dayan and his chief military
adviser General Rehavam Ze'evi (now the leader
of the transfer-advocating Moledet
(`Fatherland') party) already recognized the
full dimensions of the (Israeli] defeat.'
They came to this recognition in spite of being
misinformed by some
(48)
generals, especially the commander of the
Southern Command responsible for the Suez front,
Gonen (alias Gorodish) who `kept reporting
favourable developments only'. Shortly
afterwards Dayan reported his conclusions to
several Israeli ministers and then to Prime
Minister Golda Meir. The next day (8 October),
counterattacks by fresh Israeli forces, were,
according to Brown, `predicated on the Air
Force's false reports of smashing successes'. No
wonder the counter-attacks ended up in another
defeat, more decisive than the defeats of the
previous day. Although at the session of the
Israeli government held on the evening of that
day Dayan did not reveal the extent of the
defeat, he was well aware of it. On a piece of
paper guarded by Brown he sketched guidelines to
be followed during the next several days. After
summarizing the adversities on the Egyptian
front he wrote there: `Everything possible
should be done to terminate fighting on the
Northern [Syrian] front at once, so that
we have only one [the Egyptian] front to
cope with.' He decided to discuss this with the
Chief of Staff, David Elazar. Next morning he
met senior officers to whom he presented another
argument for terminating the war against Syria
`at once': `I expect traumatic reactions when
the Israelis discover the truth.' As subsequent
developments showed, in this respect Dayan was a
good prophet. Possibly, the crucial
consideration underlying his subsequent
decisions was to prevent Israelis from learning
the truth.
`At the meeting (with senior officers]',
continues Sarna, `instructions were drafted
which even Brown considered devoid of all
precedent.' In addition to orders to Israeli
troops fighting the Syrians on the ground to
destroy the Syrian Army without regard for their
own casualties, they also included `the orders
to find out by any means, including the most
bizarre ones, what could be done' in order to
defeat the Syrians rapidly. Brown explains to
Sama that `it was Dayan who first advanced the
idea that Syria must be crushed to pieces. When
he talked about "the bizarre means", he meant to
stress that anything was conceivable ... In the
diaries of Brown from that time, the word
"Damascus" from that moment onward begins to
appear very frequently. Dayan, the Chief of
Staff, the commander of the Air Force, all
talked about Damascus. "We must smash Syria
within the next 24 hours", said the Chief of
Staff to the accompanying officers. "We have 400
tanks now fighting like hell. Therefore the
Syrian cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and
Latakia should be obliterated. I must do
something dramatic enough to make Syria cry
`Whoah!', to make them beg us `Please stop
firing!' For that purpose I need something that
will deprive them of all electricity, destroy
all their power stations, and scorch their
earth"'.
But in order to use such `bizarre means',
Israeli generals needed an authorization by
civilian authorities. The next day Dayan,
(49)
accompanied bc Yigal Alon [a renowned
Palmach commander in 1948 and Cormer Foreign
Minister] `who backed him', held an early
morning meeting with Golda Meir. Sarna does not
know what transpired there, except for the
outcome. No permission to use `bizarre means'
was granted. Instead, `the Air Force was
instructed by the Chief of Staff "to smash
Syria"' by conventional means. The government
which met later that day was informed that
during the air raid on Damascus taking place
simultaneously, `all targets had already been
hit'. Only after the ministers dispersed, a
report arrived `that only some targets had been
hit, among them the Soviet cultural center'.
Damascus was not obliterated by conventional
means. The Air Force attributed its failure 'to
heavy cloud'.
At this point Sama's narrative 6reaks for
about seven to eight days. This may be due
either to Brown's reluctance to talk or to a
censorship ban. Judging by references to events
on the Syrian front, the narrative resumes from
15-16 October. By then, Israeli commanders,
instead of working alone as they did at the
beginning of the war, were working in close
coordination with Henry Kissinger. The planning
aimed no longer at obliterating Damascus (other
Syrian cities were no longer even mentioned),
but at besieging or conquering it. Only some of
the generals demanded sterner measures. The idea
animating everybody was to conclude the war by a
great victory in the style of the Six Day War,
but on a larger scale.
One October night Dayan wrote an instruction:
`I plan complete destruction of the Syrian army.
If Damascus can be conquered, its conquest
should be considered ... Our entry into Damascus
could balance our retreat from the
[Suez] Canal.' Next morning `the Chief
of Staff asked for a missile of 40-km range to
be launched on to Damascus. Dayan rejected that
request.' We can make the conjecture that the
missile which the Chief of Staff requested was
not meant to have a conventional warhead. Then
Dayan went to the command of General Rafael
Eitan on the Syrian front to tell him: `Our aim
is to reach Damascus. The conduct of the war
depends on our ability to reach Damascus ... We
should proceed toward it, attacking on a narrow
front, and [then] make an assault on the
city, so that they will be forced to beg us to
refrain from conquering it.' Eitan is recorded
by Brown as promising Dayan that Damascus would
soon be conquered and as issuing the requisite
orders at once, while Dayan watched to see what
would follow: `After two hours the spearhead of
the advancing Armour brigade commanded by
Gener-al Lemer, reported having been hit by a
Syrian anti-tank Corce. The Syrians awaited the
Israelis in ambush and inflicted heavy
casualties. Yet Dayan continued to think about
the conquest of Damascus.' After several hours,
when Lerner's brigade
(50)
retreated and began reassembling, `Dayan
radioed Lerner: "I want to tell you that it you
reach the gates of Damascus with speed you will
vindicate our loss of the [Suez] Canal."
At the same time, however, he received s report
from the Chief of Staff: "I cannot reach
Damascus." Dayan answered: "I now want to reach
the vicinity of Damascus, rather than the city
itself. It will suffice if they say to the
Russians: "Help us to get rid of the Jews"'.
Yet the same day Dayan promised Golda Meir to
either conquer Damascus or at least reach its
outskirts, and he repeated this at a government
meeting. Then he went to the generals commanding
the Syrian front. telling them: `Our troops need
to advance no more than 5 or 7 km. From there we
can reach Damascus which lies at the distance of
only 25 km. further. This can be accomplished
easily enough.' What he apparently expected was
that after an initial offensive the Syrian Army
would break apart and run away, in the same way
as the Egyptian Army had done in 1967. In fact,
his (and his generals') reasoning relied
entirely on folk psychology: on their own
preconceptions about `Arab mentality'. Theirs
was a `strategy based on the presume~ psychology
of the Arabs'. This strategy prevailed at the
same meeting, when the commander of the Air
Force, Benny Peled, proposed that Damascus be
bombed from the air rather than conquered. Dayan
responded: `The Syrians know that aircraft sows
destruction but cannot conquer. But if we shell
them with artillery, they will feel that we are
about to conquer the city soon.'
But another factor also played its role.
Brown records that `the State Secretary
[Kissiryer] instantly receives the
reports of all the movements of the Israeli
troops. He is deliberately staying the political
process in order to enable Israel to negotiate
later from a more advantageous position.
Kissinger is certain that Damascus will be
conquered, to the point of having quipped to
Dinitz [Israeli Ambassador in the US]:
"As soon as you reach the suburbs of Damascus,
all you will need for the rest is the public
transport"'. He said it `ten days before the end
of the war'. It was due to his interaction with
Kissinger that Dayan insisted on `the conquest
of Damascus within a few days'.
The role of Begin, then head of the Israeli
opposition, was downright comical. Prompted by
`the phone calls I keep getting from Sharon at
the [Egyptian] front', Begin told Dayan
that the conquest of Damascus was imperative
`for the sake of liberating the Syrian Jews'.
(He apparently meant those who would survive the
bombing of Damascus.) Dayan dismissed him
courteously. Dayan was still so sure that
Damascus could at the very least be besieged by
the Israeli forces that `he began to worry about
what might happen to those forces in the
vicinity of Damascus during the entire rainy
season', i.e. the winter.
(51)
Sarna, who served all that time at the front,
records that the aim of conquering Damascus was
passed on to the troops. `In fact, the
[Israeli] forces in the Golan Heights
were already exhausted and unable to break
through the [Syrian] defence lines
separating them from Damascus. Still, the goal
of conquering Damascus raised the morale of the
troops, their faith in the continuous attack and
their ability to be always able to advance
toward designated targets'. Yet he reflects: `I
now think that distances on the Chief of Staff's
maps must have seemed short compared to the
slowness of our advances and to the scale of our
casualties in human lives and also in armour
which we suffered for each of 100 meters we have
traversed ... As a tankist advancing on "a
narrow front" towards Damascus, I recall how
distant we were from the city, how dispirited
while watching their defence lines, how worn out
by their continuous mortar shelling of our night
encampments. The attempt to conquer Damascus was
unreal but at the same time it was essential
because it restored our morale after our
war-machine broke down'. This is indeed a
telling testimony of ignorance of the Israeli
warlords about the conditions their own soldiers
were fighting under. To all appearances, that
ignorance has deepened since.
Sarna's story is ominous because the
fundamental aims of the Israeli army top
commanders can be presumed to remain the same
and the folk psychology guiding their decisions
can be presumed not to have changed either. The
ideas of fighting Syria with nuclear weapons are
unlikely to have been discarded. The recourse to
nuclear weapons on Israel's part, whether for
the sake of obliterating the four mentioned
Syrian cities or of Damascus alone seems to have
been prevented in 1973 by the opposition of
Golda Meir and Henry Kissinger, both of whom
preferred Israel to conquer Damascus by
conventional means.
Past
contacts between Israel and Saddam Hussein 10
November 1990
In the middle of the present Gulf crisis it
is worth recalling that until a few months ago
Saddam Hussein persistently offered to make
peace with Israel on the latter's terms. One of
his attempts took place about a year ago. The
then Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was during
one of his visits to the US then approached with
an offer that he meet Saddam Hussein.
Information to this effect appeared in two
articles by the senior strategy and military
correspondent of Haarerz, Ze'ev Shiff, who in
matters of historical fact can be considered
quite reliable (Haaretz, 5 and 6 November 1990).
Interestingly, Rabin refused to either confirm
or deny the
(52)
revelations, after Haaretz accorded them
publicity by printing them or. its front
page.
The middleman chosen by Saddam Hussein was
`an American businessman of Arab descent ... Bob
Abud. At present he is the president of the
First City Bank of Texas. In the past he
presided over the oil company owned by the
multi-millionaire Armand Hammer ... He is 62,
well-known for his good relations with some
heads of Arab states, for whom he arranges
personal loans on easy terms. He also maintains
good relations with the Arab-American community.
After twelve years of heading Hammer's oil
company `Occidental Petroleum', he became
president of a Chicago bank', where `he
developed an interest in advancing the cause of
peace between Israel and the Arab states'
(Shiff, 6 November). It is not irrelevant to
note that Armand Hammer, who is Jewish, has for
many years been a fervent Israel supporter, a
generous contributor to United Jewish Appeal (of
the US] and a major investor in Israel, in
addition to being used by Israeli diplomacy as a
middleman in political ventures, for example
arranging the immigration of Soviet Jews to
Israel through his contacts with top Soviet
leaders.
As Shiff reports it (5 November) the offer
was made by Saddam Hussein, who proposed through
Abud `to meet with Yitzhak Rabin, then
[Israeli] Defence minister. The dates of
two meetings, to be held in Europe were already
fixed, although the Iraqis requested to
reschedule them. A secret meeting between Rabin
and the middleman was held in Philadelphia.'
According to Shiff, Abud, `was held by the
Israelis in respect, as somebody with useful
connections. Considering this, Rabin expressed
his desire to meet him in order to hear directly
about the Iraqi proposal.' Prior to meeting
Rabin, Mr Abud met several times `an Israeli
businessman living most of his time abroad,
Azriel Einav', known for having good connections
within the Israeli Detence Ministry and other
components of the Israeli Security System. When
those meetings proved successful and the consent
of Rabin to establish contacts with Saddam
Hussein was obtained, an influential aide and
personal friend of Rabin, Eytan Haber `was
appointed as a go-between in charge of arranging
the meetings' of Rabin with Saddam Hussein. When
confronted by Shiff with the evidence, Haber
responded that "`something like that" had indeed
occurred', but refused to provide any further
information.
The Philadelphia meeting of Abud with Rabin
was held when the latter attended the opening of
an Israeli Bonds convention in that city. Haber
and the military secretary of Rabin, Kuti Mor
were present during a part of the meeting with
Abud. To prevent the press from noticing the
meetings, Mr Abud `entered the hotel through the
kitchen door and proceeded to Rabin's suite by a
service elevator'. On the agenda was, first,
`the proposal [of Saddam
(53)
Hussein] to meet in order to talk about
reconciling the interests of the two states',
and, the second, means of averting an Israeli
attack on Iraq which was rumoured to be under
preparation: `Rabin accepted the proposal to
meet Saddam Hussein at a location to be
determined, but rejected the proposal to include
a PLO representative during part of these
talks.' After this agreement, Mr Abud suggested
in the name of Saddam Hussein, that `Rabin may
be invited to a meeting in Baghdad', instead of
a meeting in Europe. There is no information
about how Rabin responded to this interesting
suggestion, except that he `opined that all
leads toward peace with all the Arab states
deserve to be examined'.
Contacts between Israel and Iraq and the
timing of various meetings were negotiated and
renegotiated by Israel and Iraq through the
above mentioned go-between during several
subsequent months, `but when the tension between
[Israel] and Iraq began to mount after
Saddam Hussein's speech at the last February's
conference of the Council for Economic
Cooperation between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and
Yemen, the idea of meeting was shelved',
apparently by Israel. Shiff (5 November) writes
in conclusion: `Supposedly, the American
businessman was reporting all the details of the
negotiations to the White House.'
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