|
2
Israel's
Strategic Aims and Nuclear Weapons
(…)
(36)
General Saguy fully shares the notion of a
threat to Israel's very survival: `Syria has
always been and still is a threat to the
security and very survival of the State of
Israel', the reason being that `Syria continues
to arm itself.' This statement is documented by
a long list of Syrian weaponry purchases without
mentioning Israeli ones. Saguy does admit that
Syria is afraid of Israel and that its armament
is motivated by the wish `to confront the
Israeli strategic [i.e. nuclear]
weaponry, which the Arabs believe Israel
possesses'. He also admits that Syria is afraid
of a massive Israeli invasion of its territory:
:According to the Taif Agreement [between
Syria and Lebanon] Syria is allowed to keep
the bulk of its armed forces in the
[Lebanese] Baalbek area. The Syrians
believe that such a deployment can be an answer
to an Israeli attempt to outflank Damascus
[from the north] in the event of a war.'
Let me comment on this. As is known, the area
between Damascus and the Golan Heights is
heavily fortified but no fortifications seem to
exist north of Damascus or along the
Syrian-Lebanese borders. Since outflanking a
fortified defence line has been the Israeli
Army's favourite method of attacking, Syrian
fears appear to me well-grounded.
What Saguy says he is afraid of, is `a
Syrian-Iranian alliance'. The exchange on this
subject with his interviewer deserves to be
quoted in extenso: `Question: Can an alliance of
Syria with Iran serve as a substitute for an
alliance between Syria and Iraq in the formation
of the eastern front against Israel? Answer:
There is a collaboration between Syria and Iran
in plenty of things. It is going to be closer.
Perhaps even in strategic weaponry, and the
non-conventional ventures. Question: Is Iran
helping Syria to obtain nuclear weapons? Answer:
At this stage not yet. But when Iran itself
becomes nuclearized, I cannot see how it can
avoid cooperating [in this matter] with
Syria. Such a prospect should worry us, even
though it is still distant ... In ten years'
time Iran will certainly become a decisive
factor in the entire region, and as such an
ever-present threat to its peace. This can
hardly be prevented, unless somebody intervenes
directly. It is quite probable that outside
factors such as the US, alone or together with
other states, would intervene to halt the
progress of Iranian rearmarment. But a
historical paradox is also possible: Iraq may
rearm itself, with the effect of checking the
growth of Iranian armed power.'
A long-standing Israeli custom commands the
generals in active service to stop short of
saying too much in interviews, but it lets
semi-official experts or retired generals reveal
the Israeli strategic intentions to the nation's
elite in a more informative manner. The
explanation of the crucial and most sensitive
Israeli strategic aims,
(37)
concerning the role of nuclear weapons in
overall Israeli strategy was left to Oded Brosh.
Brosh begins by saying that some Israelis are
now raising the question whether `Israeli
nuclear power' helps or obstructs a transferral
of the regional conflict to diplomatic channels.
This he deplores, since the very phrasing of
this question in such terms `introduces a bias
in favour of the recent opponents of Israel's
nuclear option, while casting a negative light
on the supporters of this option'. He is
particularly virulent against some unnamed
advocates of an `appeasement' in the form of
only 'a limited use of Israeli nuclear power,
referred to as "the last-minute option"'. Those
obscure remarks may refer to the bare beginning
of a belated but at least serious discussion of
the health hazards contingent on the existence
of nuclear installations. Brosh's article was
indeed, `balanced' in Haaretz by another
article, printed right next to it which for the
first time in Israel's history reported how
people had organized themselves in protest
against health hazards stemming from the
existence of a civilian nuclear installation in
their neighbourhood. But without any
attribution, Brosh also refers to claims, still
unattributable, to the effect that `Dimona might
yet become another Chernobyl'. He concedes that
`the responsible authorities indeed need to test
again and again' their precautionary measures,
forgetting that 'the authorities responsible for
Chemobyl also claimed that they had been
recurrently testing their precautions. He leaves
unanswered the question of who in Israel can be
authorized to test the testing undertaken by
unnamed `authorities'.
Brosh must be presumed to aim his polemic at
critics more prominent than those concerning
themselves with health hazards, because he
mentions some unnamed Israelis who are said by
him to argue `that in view of what the foreign
media report from time to time about the growth
of Israel's nuclear assets, their further growth
should be halted. Sometimes it is even being
argued that somebody authorized or unauthorized
might activate one or several Israeli nuclear
warheads through either error or accident.
Moreover, some argue that Israel's unremittent
nuclear development only propels Arab countries,
Iran and other Muslim states to equip themselves
with all sorts of non-conventional, but
primarily nuclear, weapons.' None of these
apprehensions have ever appeared not only in the
censored Hebrew press but, to the best of my
knowledge, in the mainstream international press
as well. All of them are nevertheless in my view
quite justified. Not only is the prospect of
Dimona one day becoming another Chernobyl
something to be seriously discussed. The
prospect of Gush Emunim ('The Block of the
Faithful'), or some secular right-wing Israeli
fanatics, or some of the delirious Israeli Army
generals, seizing control of Israeli nuclear
weapons and using them in accordance with their
`knowledge' of politics or by the authority of
`divine command'
(38)
cannot be precluded either. In my view the
likelihood of the occurrence of some such
calamity is growing. We should not forget that
while Israeli Jewish society undergoes a steady
political polarization, the Israeli Security
System increasingly relies on the recruitment of
cohorts from the ranks of the extreme tight.
Brosh hurries to admit to his readers that
`not everybody who hates Dimona - whether in
Israeli or abroad - hates Israel. On the
contrary, a great many foreigners who perceive
the Dimona reactor as an evil have an affection
for Israel.' Yet the Israelis who `hate Dimona'
are apparently not quite the same. Brosh is
worried by their critique, especially since they
are said by him to propose `that the Dimona
reactor be closed' in order to be thereafter
`accessible to international controls capable of
proving to our neighbours that we no longer
produce any fissionable substances'. Such a
proof could be offered `to our neighbours'
either in a gesture of good will or within the
framework of a regional settlement. But while
admitting the desirability of more frequent and
thorough checks to preclude Chernobyl-like
accidents, Brosh disqualifies `all other
apprehensions of the enemies of Dimona as
flunking the test of technical and political
realities in our region'. We need to keep in
mind that Israeli censorship has thus far
prevented the publication of what `the enemies
of Dimona' have to say. We know about their
existence and their arguments only what their
open enemy, Brosh, wanted and was permitted by
that censorship to tell us.
Let me ignore Brosh's brief, superficial and
in my view inaccurate presentation of the
mentioned `technical realities'. Let me just
mention that he highly commends `what goes under
the name of the neutron bomb, developed by the
Americans in the 1970s'. Let me concentrate on
what, apparently reiterating the lessons learned
from his mentors, he has to say about `the
political realities in our region', in so far as
they have a bearing upon Israeli nuclear power.
Regarding the uses of Israeli nuclear weapons
during a war, Brosh sees two major options. The
first, `the last-minute option' is defined as `a
scenario which in fact presumes that Israel will
refrain from making any nuclear threats unless
it is defeated by conventional weapons, or can
realistically expect such a defeat as imminent,
or is threatened by use of non-conventional
weapons'. In this way `the Arab leaders can be
denied a victory' by the threat of `the
destruction of Arab civilization'. In my view,
this can be interpreted as meaning that Israel
has contingency plans for cases of extreme
emergency which envisage a devastation by
nuclear weapons of a considerable number of Arab
urban centres and such crucial installations as
the Aswan Dam (whose destruction was envisaged
in Israel before 1973). This awful possibility
needs to be faced, however horrifying may be the
thought about its direct effects on the Arab
world and indirect effects upon the entire world
in terms of massive human
(39)
casualties and the long-term effects of
radioactivity. 1'he likely existence of such
plans needs to be considered jointly with a
passage about `somebody authorized or
unauthorized [who] might activate one or
several Israeli nuclear warheads through error
or accident'. A juxtaposition of the two
passages adds to both clarity and horror. By
1992, Israel already abounds in Jewish religious
zealots whose influence within the Security
System is growing steadily. Gush Emunim or the
followers of any extremist Hassidic rabbi are
quite capable in my view of activating such
scenarios even in peacetime for the sake of thus
advancing their Messianic prophecies which by
definition imply that God will protect the Jews
from any injury and inflict devastation on
Gentiles alone.
But Brosh does not favour `the last-minute
option'. Being by no means a religious fanatic
he does clearly realize that this option implies
not just `the destruction of the Arab
civilization', but also `our own national
suicide'. He also has strategic objections
against this option which can be conjectured to
draw on the experience of the October 1973 War.
He anticipates that the Arab leaders might
attack Israel, not for the sake of defeating it
but for other reasons. In case the attack turns
militarily successful, `the last-minute option'
might prompt the Israeli leaders, even the
relatively sane among them, to a nuclear
response. When dealing with the long-concealed
events of October 1973 War, I documented that
the Israeli Army High Command of that time,
possibly including Moshe Dayan, favoured Israeli
nuclear response against Syria, but were halted
in doing so by Golda Meir, backed by Kissinger.
Much as I abhor what Brosh says I have to admit
that he is not the most extremist among Israeli
expens anticipating the use of nuclear
weapons.
Brosh's own proposals, which can be assumed
express the views of the Israeli Security
System, rest on the assumption that `it is
preferable to competently elaborate a system of
options which would include the
instrumentalities of handling the problems
arising from a potential massive missile or
armoured attack against us, if it one day
materializes, and which would prepare means to
deter such an attack, or to foil it, if the
deterrence fails'. He adds that pertinent
Israeli `decisions should better not be dictated
by outside factors', a transparent allusion to
the US. This option should not be resorted to in
his opinion, `as long as the threat to us comes
from no more than a single, even if major, Arab
state such as Syria' and if it involves onlyo
the use of conventional weapons. He immediately
stipulates, however, that `even in such a case,
it would be preferable to leave the enemy
befogged about our intentions'. Let me clarify,
however, that in Israeli terminology, the
launching of missiles on to Israeli territory is
regarded as 'non
(40)
conventional', regardless of whether they are
equipped with explosives or poison gas.
Still arguing against his unidentified
opponents, Brosh contends that 'their is
absolutely no connection between unremitting
Israeli nuclear development and Arab, Iranian or
Pakistani pursuits', in spite of the fact that
Israeli nuclear weapons are, or at least may be,
aimed at those countries. But Brosh goes even
deeper in his arguments: 'Generally, in
long-term security planning one cannot ignore
the political factors. Israel must take into
account, for example, that the Saudi royal
family is not going to reign forever or that the
Egyptian regime may change.' Precisely because
of such political contingencies Israel must
remain free to use or threaten to use its
nuclear weapons. Brosh argues that `we need not
be ashamed that the nuclear option is a major
instrumentality of our defence as a deterrent
against those who may attack us. The three big
democracies have relied on the same deterrent
for decades.' The very comparison of Israel's
strategic aims with those of the US, Britain and
France is an irrefutable proof of Israel's
ambition to achieve the status of a superpower.
But Israel can become a superpower only if it
succeeds in establishing a hegemony over the
entire Middle East. Meanwhile, there is one
crucial difference between Israel and `the three
big democracies'. The French, for example, pay
themselves for developing their own nuclear
power. The development of Israeli nuclear power
is, by contrast, being financed by the US. Money
for this purpose can be obtained only ,f
Congress toes the line of the organized segment
of the American Jewish community and of its
various allies. And in the process, the American
public must be effectively deceived about
Israel's real strategic aims.
The Israeli grand strategy' has diverse
strands. The task of blending them together into
a single overarching concept was undertaken by
General (Reserves) Shlomo Gazit in an article
remarkable for its lucidity and forthrightness
(Yedior Ahronnr, 27 .April). Gazit is a former
Military Intelligence commander who often
explains in the media the strategic aims of the
Israeli Security System, or else provides
apologias for what the public tends to regard as
its blunders or failures. His article has two
avowed aims. The first, common also to several
other prestigious Israeli press commentators
writing at about the same time, is to convince
the public that what `we used to hear for many
years, almost since the birth of the State,
about Israel as a strategic asset for the US and
of the free world', remains no less valid after
the demise of the USSR and the termination of
the Cold War than it had been before. Let me
ignore a greater part of tis historical
presentation of how and why Israel could become
so wonderful a strategic asset in the past,
except for a single point which contains
something new. The point
(41)
is this: `Israel proposed to the .American
armed forces that in the event of a war
[with the USSR] it might provide the
Americans with a variety of services, namely
harbour, resupply, storage, medical treatment
and hospitalization services.'
However Gazit admits that the value of
Israel's actually rendered services oC the Cold
War period `did dwindle, perhaps even
completely, as [the US] no longer needs
to be prepared for war with the Soviet bloc'.
This became apparent `over a year ago, when the
largest military force since World War II
assembled during the Gulf War in our own region,
in the very heart of the Middle East. Israel was
ignored when this war was fought. Moreover, hope
was expressed and concrete steps taken for the
single aim of precluding Israel's involvement in
that war.' Gazit even admits why it was so: `due
to what from the Israeli point of view is a very
sad but salient fact, namely that (with the
possible exception of Egypt which had signed a
peace treaty with us), no other Arab state can
be a party to any military or security-aimed
alliance, if Israel is also a party to it.' This
was why, explains Gazit, `the Israeli Army was
not actively involved in the war against Iraq'.
This was why the armed forces of the anti-Iraqi
coalition were not stationed on Israeli
territory, as a result of 'the Arab veto'.
Expecting his readers to consequently ask, `What
has still remained of Israel's traditional role
as a strategic asset, then?', Gazit proceeds to
lay bare the more decisive and lasting aspects
of that role.
This is the second purpose of Gazit's
article, even more important than the first. He
believes, correctly in my view, that Israel
still remains a strategic asset as it was in the
past. His lucid explanation deserves to be
quoted extensively: `Israel's main task has not
changed at all, and it remains of crucial
importance. The geographical location of Israel
at the centre of the Arab-Muslim Middle East
predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of
stability in all the countries surrounding it.
Its [role] is to protect the existing
regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of
radicalization and to block the expansion of
fundamentalist religious zealotry. Israel has
its "red lines", which have a powerful deterrent
effect by virtue of causing uncertainty beyond
its borders, precisely because they are not
clearly marked nor explicitly defined. The
purpose of these red lines is to determine which
strategic developments or other changes
occurring beyond Israel's borders can be defined
as threats which Israel itself will regard as
intolerable to the point of being compelled to
use all its militaryo power for the sake of
their prevention or eradication.' In other
words, the red lines are Israeli dictatorial
ultimata imposed by it on all the other Middle
Eastern states.
Gazit distinguishes 'three kinds of
developments' among the processes of
radicalization `which qualify as intolerable'
[to Israel]. The first category is
constituted by acts of anti-Israeli
terrorism
(42)
originating from the territory of another
state. Gazit is forthright enough to say that
Israel retaliates against a given state not only
in its own defence, but more in the best
interest of an .4rab government concerned: '.An
Arab government allowing a terrorist
organization to run free, creates a monster
which sooner or later will turn against it. If
it does not take steps to halt any development
hostile to itself and to re-establish its total
control, it will eventually cease to rule its
own country.'
The second category of the red line is
applied in case of 'any entry of a foreign Arab
military force on to the territory of a state
which borders on Israel, i.e. practically
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.' (Although Egypt
borders on Israel, it is not mentioned.) As in
the previous case, Gazit is anxious to show that
Israel has in such cases ;n benevolent concern
for the stability of a given Arab regime: `An
entry of a foreign Arab military force poses
also a threat to the stability of the regime of
the country thus affected, and sometimes also to
the latter's sovereignty. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that the Israeli red line which
deters and prevents entries of foreign Arab
military forces to countries neighbouring with
Israel is also a stabilizing factor which really
protects the existing states and regimes in the
entire Middle East.'
The third category of the `red line' is in
Gazit's view, and in mine as well, the most
important. It is intended to preclude the
developments which he defines as `threats of a
revolt, whether military or popular, which may
end up by bringing fanatical and extremist
elements to power in states concerned. The
existence of such threats has no connection with
the Arab-Israeli conflict. They exist because
the regimes [of the region] find it
difficult to offer solutions to their
socio-economic ills. But any development of the
described kind is apt to subvert the existing
relations between Israel and this or that from
among its neighbours. The prime examples of such
a red line are concerns for the preservation of
Israel's peace treaty with Egypt and of the de
facto peaceful cooperation between Israel and
Jordan. In both cases it is Israel's red lines
which communicate to its neighbours that Israel
will not tolerate anything that might encourage
the extremist forces to go all the way,
following in the footsteps of either the
Iranians to the east or the Algerians to the
west.' Gazit backs this statement by mentioning
the Israeli intervention in defence of the
Jordanian regime during the `Black September'
uprising of 1970. He discussed more extensively
the developments in Lebanon in the wake of the
outbreak of the Civil War in 1975: `When the
Syrians were invited by some Maronites to
intervene to stop the fighting and trounce the
Muslims, they were at first deterred [by
Israel] from advancing. When in the end the
Syrian forces did advance, they clearly avoided
anything which Israel could interpret as
aberrant and thereby
(43)
violating its red line.' It is well known (at
least in Israel), that Syrian advancement had
culminated in the 1976 siege of Tel El-Zaatar
and the massacre of the Palestinians there. The
massacre was perpetrated by Falangists supported
by the Syrian army, with Israel fully approving.
Senior Israeli Army officers were then spotted
as observers in the Falangist camp, located in
the vicinity of where the Syrian troops were
stationed.
According to Gazit, however, this form of
`Israeli influence' may well extend beyond the
Arab countries neighbouring with Israel:
`Indirectly, it also radiates on to all the
other states of our region. In almost all of
them, some kind of radicalization is going on,
except that the radical forces are deterred from
pushing all the way through out of fear that
their maximalism might prompt Israel to respond.
Although no one would say so openly, I am
positive that the regime of President Mubarak
benefits from such an Israeli deterrence. If
power [in Egypt] is ever seized by
Islamic extremists, they will at once have to
decide whether to recognize the peace treaty
with Israel as binding or not. It will be a most
difficult decision for them. If they do
recognize the treaty, they will compromise their
own ideology. And if they don't recognize it,
they will at once have a war for which they
cannot possibly be ready.'
In Gazit's view, by virtue of protecting all
or most Middle Eastern regimes, Israel performs
a vital service for `the industrially advanced
states, all of which are keenly concerned with
guaranteeing the stability in the Middle East'.
He speculates that without Israel, the regimes
of the region would have collapsed long ago. He
concludes, `In the aftermath of the
disappearance of the USSR as a political power
with interests of its own in the region a number
of Middle Eastern states lost a patron
guaranteeing their political, military and
economic viability. A vacuum was thus created,
adding to the region's instability. Under such
conditions the Israeli role as a strategic asset
guaranteeing a modicum of stability in the
entire Middle East did not dwindle o: disappear
but was elevated to the first order of
magnitude. Without Israel, the West would have
to perform this role by itself, when none of the
existing superpowers really could perform it,
because of various domestic and international
constraints. For Israel, by contrast, the need
to intervene is a matter of survival.'
Let me recall in this context several facts
of crucial importance. First, that speaking in
the context of possible uses of Israeli nuclear
power, Brosh revealed that Israel has
contingency plans to be applied if `the Egyptian
regime may change' or because `the Saudi royal
family will not reign forever'. By comparing
Gazit with Brosh, we can grasp better the nature
of Israeli strategic aims. Israel is preparing
for a war, nuclear if need be, for the sake of
averting domestic change not to its liking, if
it occurs in some or any Middle
(44)
Eastern states. At some time after the fall
of the Shah it was disclosed that in the last
days of his regime the Israeli Army planned to
dispatch its elite units to Tehran in order to
relieve the hard-pressed Iranian generals,
except that Begin, in a display of relative
moderation refused to okay the venture.
However, as Gazit rightly points out, the
USSR collapsed. As long as it existed it was a
strategic factor of prime importance, because
threat of Soviet intervention was to some extent
deterring Israel from a direct and undisguised
pursuit of hegemony over the entire Middle East.
Now, as Gazir rightly observes, `a vacuum was
created' which neither the US nor any other
`industrially advanced state' can fill up, at
least in Gazit's sense of the term. No faraway
power will in the foreseeable future be able to
invade a Middle Eastern. state, while using or
threatening to use its nuclear arms in the
process, only because it would dislike a
domestic radicalization occurring within the
internationally recognized borders of that
state. Let us recall that even when Iraq
persisted in its annexation of Kuwait, Bush
could obtain only a slim majority in the US
Congress in favour of opening the Gulf War. Can
Congress be envisioned to approve an invasion of
a Middle Eastern state in a mere response to a
popular revolution there? The answer cannot but
be either categorically negative, or at least
anticipative of nearly unsurmoun2able obstacles
that the US or any other Western power would in
such a case have to cope with. There can be no
doubt that in Israel, where even the Knesset
doesn't need to be consulted before an armed
aggression, no analogous obstacles exist. The
Israeli government has the legal right to
initiate a war, and it can be certain of an
initial approval for it by a huge majority of
the Jewish public, regardless of circumstances
under which that war breaks out. In the past,
whenever the Knesset was notified of an
aggressive war already in progress, it would
approve it enthusiastically, by a huge
majority.
Knesset ratifications of the already ongoing
wars actually occurred in 1967 and in 1982. But
the best example of it, allowing us to probe
deeper into the pattern of the Knesset's
behaviour, is its ratification of the Suez War
in 1956. After Ben-Gurion told the Knesset, on
the third day of the war, that the war's purpose
was `to re-establish the kingdom of David and
Solomon' by annexing Sinai, our ancestral
property `which is not a part of Egypt', as well
as to liberate the Egyptians and the whole world
from the tyranny of Nasser, the entire Knesset,
with the exception of the four Communist MKs,
got up and stood to attention to sing the
Israeli national anthem. Only threats from
Khrushchev and from Eisenhower eventually
convinced Ben-Gurion to reverse himself on this
score. Yet Ben-Gurion was a realist and he ruled
over the Army with an iron fist.
(45)
Under the new conditions of `a vacuum
[which] was created' by the demise of
the USSR, and by the increasing vulnerability of
the US, Israel clearly prepares itself to seek
overtly a hegemony over the entire Middle East
which it has always sought covertly, without
hesitating to use for the purpose all means
available, including nuclear ones. Contrary to
what Gazit, Shuval or other Israeli spokesmen
say, however, this venture is not being
undertaken for the sake of benefiting the West.
The West is comprised primarily of Gentiles, and
Israel is a Jewish state whose sole purpose is
to benefit Jews alone. Israel's search for
hegemony stems from its own time-honoured
ambitions which now dictate its strategic
aims.
|